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Abstract: Our Response is centered on five major themes: (1) our presentation of human
mythologies about sheep; (2) the relevance of cognitive complexity (“intelligence”) as a
dimension underlying the way people perceive and treat sheep; (3) whether our review is too
anthropocentric or anthropomorphic; (4) animal welfare versus animal rights (abolitionism);
and (5) whether knowledge and education are enough to change human attitudes and
behavior.
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We begin by expressing our appreciation for the many viewpoints offered and for the
opportunity to enter into discussion through Open Peer Commentary. The commentaries
represent a wide range of thought and opinion on the issues presented in our target article.
We would like to begin by reviewing the important elements.
The purpose of our article was to review the scientific literature on sheep cognition,
personality, emotions, and sociality. We based our survey on findings from peer-reviewed
publications because that is the literature that is the most robust, conservative, and objective
among all the different ways one could approach this issue. We did not include anecdotal
information because there is no way to confirm it. We chose to focus on findings on the more
complex end of the psychological spectrum because we wanted to highlight the ways the
psychology of sheep overlaps with that of our own species and other species we consider
sophisticated and intelligent. This decision was not due to a lack of concern about
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anthropocentrism. We wanted to position our study and understanding of sheep psychology
firmly in basic comparative psychology so the scientific community could better appreciate
that sheep are mammals with an evolutionary history and context that goes well beyond their
use as commodities.
We concluded that there is abundant evidence that the capacities for learning,
cognition, emotion, personality, and social complexity in sheep are on a par with those of
many other mammalian (and even primate) species. This contradicts historical and current
perceptions of sheep as dull-minded, dependent, and uniform in their nature. We conclude
with calls to reconsider the use of sheep as commodities in modern agricultural production
and in invasive research, and to study them through noninvasive, non-coercive, and
naturalistic methods.
Nearly all the commentators acknowledged the value of reviewing the research
evidence on cognition and other psychological attributes in sheep. The views ranged from
expressions of confidence that our review would change readers’ attitudes towards sheep to
reservations that although our review may be a good starting point, it is not enough in itself
to change minds. Most views fell in between. The five themes that underlie most of the points
made in the commentaries concerned: (1) the completeness and accuracy of our presentation
of human mythologies about sheep; (2) the relevance of cognitive complexity (“intelligence”)
to how we perceive and treat sheep; (3) anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism; (4)
welfare versus rights (abolitionism); and (5) whether knowledge and education are enough
to change human minds, hearts and behavior.
1. Sheep Mythology
In popular usage, “mythology” refers to narratives that may be fictional rather than factual.
Depth psychology, however, teaches us that myths are among the most important stories
cultures tell about themselves, answering life’s big questions. Animals are often used as
symbolic stand-ins for humans, experiencing trials and tribulations; they make it easier to
explain (and teach to children) about origins, love, death, and ethics. We are now “modern,”
but this does not mean the view of nonhuman animals we have learned from fables and
fairytales is gone. These stories were created at a time when humans lived in much closer
relationships with other animals and human knowledge of animals was transmitted in both
literal and symbolic ways (Merskin 2018). Today, however, for some of us, the tales we tell
about other animals (whether in stories, film, or advertisements) are the only contact we
have with them. In our article, we explored potential reasons sheep and lambs might be
misunderstood, their individual natures minimized, and their behaviors stereotyped.
Several commentators (Franklin; Porcher; Hermanson; Colombo & Raucea) focus
on this introductory aspect of our target article. Colombo & Raucea feel we have
misunderstood literary and poetic portrayals of sheep. Hermanson finds the literary and
cultural history less relevant than economics to understanding human perception and
treatment of animals. Vonk, Horback, and Gygax & Nawroth criticize our article as
anthropomorphic. Sevillano makes the connection between popular cultural portrayals and
sheep stereotypes. Franklin goes further, referring to sheep as “baby-faced” in a neotenized
reading of sheep facial features. We don’t necessarily agree. Many do have large eyes and
ears, especially lambs, but they do not evoke “babyish cues” as strongly as other animals do.
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Stereotype theory certainly does produce one-dimensional assessments of others on the
basis of some perceived difference, as Franklin notes.
The commentaries include some terrific images illustrating the ways many people
who never interact with real sheep are likely to have cultivated stereotypical views (as in
other -isms such as racism and sexism); this supports our suggestion that children often learn
about sheep and other animals from cartoons and stories. Some commend our inclusion of
sheep mythology but argue that what we present is inaccurate. Porcher, for example, agrees
that there is “a blind spot in science” and that The Great Chain of Being and folkloric
understanding can reveal the source of stereotypes and prejudices about sheep. She develops
our argument that stories and tales about sheep construct cultural views that support their
erasure as individuals and plants them firmly in the role of use–object: “Biology's investment
in agribusiness, the pharmaceutical industry, the pesticide industry, the biological warfare
industry, the fishing industry, and the leather and fur industries, to name just a few, shows
the same pattern of treating nature and animals as being there to serve the human project
only.”
Colombo & Raucea argue that in fables, sheep are not docile. Their review of the
literature on fables and stories suggests that sheep are not portrayed as dumb or passive.
This may be true, but there are also ample examples where sheep are presented as less
adventuresome or aggressive than other species, and those portrayals are based on beliefs
that they are devoid of personality and intelligence. Our focus was not specifically on popular
portrayals of sheep; art, advertising, myth, and tradition paint particular pictures of them.
What Colombo & Raucea discuss could be an essay in itself. We agree that sheep, like most
other victims of torture and slaughter, are not passive recipients of such treatment. We were
not trying to perpetuate stereotypes of sheep but to expose how they serve as justification
for mistreatment and harm and how they are contradicted by research.
Hermanson agrees about the need for greater protection but questions whether
mythological portrayals have as much influence as we might think. He suggests that
economics is a more important causal factor: “The problem is not discourses of production;
it is production itself. Indeed, the 19th amendment did not depend on discovering that
women could recognize faces or exploding the stereotype that women are one-dimensional
non-individuals. Female, and male, disenfranchisement had more to do with property” (in
other words, their being property). Hermanson also reminds us that racism and sexism are
intimately connected with speciesism and that economics is what sustains inequitable
treatment in all three cases. Economics means power. We continue to suggest, however, that
belief systems grounded in mythology help to “normalize” hegemonic attitudes.
2. Relevance of “Intelligence”
Several commentators (Browning, Palmer & Sandøe; Woodford & Carter, and Vonk) ask
which is more relevant to how we should treat sheep: their cognitive capacity or their
capacity to suffer? This is a critical issue in animal ethics. Our aim was to review the full scope
of sheep psychology, not just the psychological dimensions most relevant to suffering; but we
agree that the ability to suffer is particularly important. Cognitive and social complexity are
themselves relevant to suffering, however, shaping the adaptation and even the awareness
of different species to various circumstances. Hence the relation between cognitive capacity
and suffering is worth analyzing.
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Many commentators (Colombo & Scarf; Rollin; Phillips; D’Silva; King; Paez;
Kendrick) recognize the importance of increasing our understanding of sheep psychology
“across the board.” Li emphasizes recognizing the complexity and individuality of sheep and
other animals for a better perspective on our own species’ claims of superiority. A number of
commentators suggest that intelligence and cognitive complexity come into play in more
practical terms in studying how sheep learn to cope in various situations (Webster) and how
enriching their environment and devices can enhance their well-being (Browning; Found).
Found emphasizes the potential contribution of research findings on domestic and wild
ungulates to welfare policies and conservation strategies. Yet knowledge itself is not
sufficient to change perspectives and behavior (as discussed in section 5, below). Hanlon
voices frustration that we still need to “prove” that other animals are complex, sentient
creatures, capable of suffering, in order to justify protecting them (even inadequately). We
share her sentiments.
McLennan points out that research findings should be applied to providing
appropriate treatment for sheep and other animals. We agree that welfare practices must be
based on data. Kiley-Worthington, on the other hand, rejects a scientific and objective
approach to studying sheep and other animals in favor of a more subjective, anecdotal
approach. She is dismissive of the methodology we used and suggests that shepherds and
others who interact with sheep daily already know that sheep are capable of the capacities
we discuss. The problem with “folk psychology” is that it does not protect against bias:
shepherds and others who “work with the animals” on a daily basis in a context of exploiting
them are going to view the animals in an instrumental way, shaped by their use.
3. Anthropocentrism/Anthropomorphism
Our target article was criticized for being too anthropocentric by some commentators and for
being too anthropomorphic by others. Anthropocentrism measures other animals’ capacities
in terms of our own, not taking into account species differences in evolutionary-adaptive
history. Anthropocentrism places humans at the top of a scale in which no other animal can
measure up (Chapman & Huffman 2018). Adolphs, Brooks Pribac, Figdor, Davis, PeñaGuzman, and Pellis all make this important point. They argue that sheep and other animals
should be studied and understood on their own terms. Although we focused selectively on
refereed research findings, we agree completely that much of this literature is based on a
human-centered view of intelligence and that it underestimates the natural abilities of other
animals. This general problem with how we study and draw conclusions about other animals
in comparative psychology goes beyond the scope of our target article. The predilection of
our own species for using ourselves as a measuring stick is a cognitive limitation, as argued
forcefully by Davis.
We wish to thank Brodbeck, Brodbeck & Rosso for making the point that
domesticated animals, like sheep, have been selected (artificially, by humans) for
temperamental traits such as shyness. Shy humans can be misperceived as being less
intelligent; we should not make the same mistake (anthropomorphizing) about sheep and
other animals. Brodbeck et al. provide a nice summary of many of the traits we reviewed in
sheep and of their occurrence in other animals. Brennan adds that even wild, nondomesticated ungulates are subject to biased views about their intelligence and complexity.
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On the other end of the spectrum, Vonk, Horback, Correia Caeiro, and Gygax &
Nawroth do not find our review as objective as they would hope, suggesting that we draw
exaggerated conclusions about the intelligence of sheep. Vonk suggests that we have “cherrypicked” the evidence. Mallatt finds this criticism too strong, given that “most of the evidence
validly supports the claims,” but he is concerned about the lack of “negative” evidence. We
agree that anthropomorphism — the attribution of human traits to nonhumans who do not
possess those traits — is to be avoided. But anthropomorphism is only anthropomorphism
when the “human” trait does not actually exist in the other animal. What we were doing in
our review was highlighting the evidence of psychological capacities that sheep share with
other species. Reviewing “negative” evidence is difficult when the objective is to review the
positive evidence: there no doubt exists also a whole range of abilities for which there is no
evidence in sheep.
Gamez, like Vonk, makes the point that we seem to over-interpret the findings on
sheep intelligence and that many aspects of sheep psychology could be “automatic.” Many
cognitive capacities in all species, including humans, are indeed unconscious or over-learned.
Gamez provides the example of personality and the dimension of shyness and boldness. His
example of emotional responses contingent on spatial distance from other sheep does not
make sense in terms of what we know personality to be: a consistent tendency to behave in
a certain way across time under the same circumstances. Gamez’s hypothesis about facial
perception in sheep being explainable by simple input-output mechanisms is not evidence
that this is indeed how sheep process faces or even that there is sufficient data to suggest this
as a reasonable psychological explanation. We do agree with Gamez, however, that flexible
hypothesis-testing abilities are hallmarks of complex intelligence and that there is evidence
for these abilities in sheep.
Abbate’s criticism is similar to that of Kiley-Worthington in that she promotes the
use of anecdotes in a systematic review of intelligence and cognition in sheep (or any
nonhuman animal). She suggests that “important anecdotes” are missing from our article. We
explicitly set out to keep anecdotal information and hearsay out of our review for the very
reason we explained above in responding to Kiley-Worthington. Anecdotal evidence
(especially popular accounts of animal behavior) is unreliable. It is not clear whether Abbate
is suggesting that the mirror self-recognition test is too narrowly focused or that it is overinterpreted by some authors. Nor is it clear that it is anthropocentric.
Willett, too, seems to misunderstand the mirror self-recognition literature. She thinks
other sensory modalities such as smell may provide better ways to probe self-awareness,
suggesting that the “yellow snow” studies with dogs demonstrate self-awareness in the
olfactory realm. Self-awareness is not modality-specific; but an experiment on whether dogs
can discriminate their own urine from that of others is not a test of self-awareness. It is simply
a test of discrimination. Willett suggests that sheep may not “pass” the mirror test because
that is not where their “emotive center” lies. We agree that motivation is important, but
Willett may be reading too much into the logic of the self-recognition protocol.
4. Welfare Versus Rights
That more knowledge about what is going on in the mind of a sheep (or any animal) ought to
promote better treatment is shared by many commentators but there were differences as to
what that “better treatment” should be. This leads to the debate between “welfarism” (make
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animal use less harmful) versus animal rights and “abolitionism” (put an end to all animal
use), which was articulated in more detail in Marino (2016). It is encouraging to see that the
majority of our peers recognize the importance of promoting well-being in sheep but we find
ourselves in the minority in our stance regarding the sufficiency of welfare-based policies
alone. Improving animal welfare is critically important; this is especially well-articulated by
D’Silva, Woodruff, Horback, and Mehrkam. But welfarism still gives priority to human
interests over the needs of other animals. Hence welfarism does not “move the needle” in our
relationship with sheep and other animals. Despite decades of welfare efforts, other animals,
including farmed sheep, are mostly worse off than ever before. The number of sheep killed
for food is growing and sheep are subjected to increasingly invasive and harmful biomedical
procedures.
We think welfare-based policies alone are not enough to remedy suffering in farmed
animals. We do not wish simply to create better conditions for exploitation: we would like to
see animal use and exploitation phased out entirely. As Li has pointed out, welfarism does
not call into question our assumptions about how humans should relate to other animals.
(D’Silva comes the closest). Welfarism eschews the issue of animal rights entirely. Woodford
& Carter claim that an abolitionist stance towards sheep is “problematic” because domestic
sheep are creations of artificial breeding, hence it does not make sense to “re-wild” them. But
nowhere do we suggest that domesticated sheep should be “re-wilded.” We are simply
pointing to the evidence that domesticated sheep have feelings, and lives to live, and that they
should be viewed and treated as such. Our target article did not ask which practices and
which levels of suffering are somehow permissible. Our aim was to lay out the empirical
evidence about sheep intelligence, emotion, personality, and sociality, not to enter into
abstract ethical debate. If it is not self-evident that neither sheep, nor any sentient being,
should be treated the way they are being treated by our species, we are at a loss as to how
any ethical theorizing would resolve the issue. Only Paez explicitly promotes the notion that
we must not only provide better welfare for sheep: we should not harm them. Taken
seriously, this is an argument for abolition, because despite the best intentions of welfare
practitioners, harm is inherent in the use of other animals as a means to our ends.
5. Is Knowledge Enough?
The most important question raised by the peer commentaries is whether simply educating
people about the facts is only necessary but not sufficient for changing attitudes toward the
treatment of other animals. The work of The Someone Project, to which our target article
belongs, is based on the hypothesis that for people to understand “who” is on their plate, they
need to be supplied with the empirical facts about the psychology of farmed animals. Phillips
and Rollin are among the commentators who think that information alone should be enough.
Other commentators, however, point out that education has often proved insufficient to
change people’s views of other animals. Mallatt and Gradidge & Zawisza make this point
especially well. We agree that it is critically important to examine the circumstances under
which information succeeds and fails to motivate attitude change. Our target article was
intended as a first step in deepening human understanding and respect for sheep. We view
this step as necessary but not enough. Understanding individual differences in what is needed
to change behavior will be essential in this kind of research, and in advocacy of any kind.
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6. Conclusion
We thank all our peers who submitted commentaries on the target article. Our own
understanding has been enhanced by their comments and the challenge of responding. We
hope the target article, the 41 thoughtful commentaries, and this Response may prompt
readers to think more deeply about their perception and treatment of sheep and other
animals.
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